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Abstract
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One of the most celebrated issues in economics is the theory of price forma-
tion. In a competitive market for a homogeneous good only the Walrasian
price –where demand and supply meet– can constitute an equilibrium, and
yet there are no satisfactory descriptions of how this price comes to be es-
tablished. The …ctitious Walrasian auctioneer has received much attention,
despite its notable absence from most real-life markets. Two important foun-
dations of a trading mechanism that captures the essential features of real
markets arethe realization that traders behave strategically (Dubey andShu-
bik, 1978), and the recognition that trade is decentralized: in most markets,
a buyer comes into “direct contact” with only a limited number of sellers,
even when there are many traders on each side of the market. These obser-
vations have led to the identi…cation of two conceptually separate stages in
the functioning of a market: matching and bargaining. In the typical model,
buyers and sellers are randomly “matched,” viz assigned to a local market.
After the matching stage, the traders in each local market engage in strategic
bargaining, following some explicit procedural rules. The agents who reach
an agreement trade and exit the market; those who do not trade are assigned
to local markets after a costly delay, possibly together with new entrants.
Following the early lead of Diamond (1981)1, this literature2 has analyzed
extensively the “pair-wise” matching model: in each local market there are
exactly one buyer and one seller. However, the results obtained are disap-
pointingly non-Walrasian: the main conclusion of this literature is that, even
as frictions vanish, the equilibrium price does not equate demand and sup-
ply, but rather the aggregate surpluses of sellers and buyers. In the simple
case of homogeneous valuations, this entails the equilibrium price to be a
strictly monotonic function of the relative size of the two sides of the market,
when, on the contrary, the Walrasian price depends only on which side of the
market is the shorter (see Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1985, and Binmore and
Herrero, 1988). In defense of the competitive market paradigm, Gale (1986,
1987) argued that if there are new entrants in each period the Walrasian
price should be calculated in terms of the incoming ‡ow of the new traders,
not of the aggregate stock of demand and supply at a given date (as Ru-
1See also Diamond and Maskin (1979) and Mortensen (1982a, 1982b).
2See Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) for an excellent survey. Note that the search
model (see McMillan and Rothschild (1994) for an overview) can also be interpreted in
this framework: the matching mechanism is determined by the search probability of the
traders who search, and the bargaining is of the take-it-or-leave-it type: the traders who
do not search post a price, and the traders on the other side of the market can accept this
price or continue to search.
1binstein and Wolinsky did). However, Gale’s clari…cation did not eliminate
the non-Walrasian feature of the Rubinstein-Wolinsky market equilibrium
constituted by the presence of permanent unsatis…ed excess demand.
Our paper reconciles the model of decentralized trade with the Walrasian
paradigm: we show that there exist decentralized trading mechanisms which
lead to the Walrasian outcome both in the stock and in the ‡ow sense. We
obtain this result by relaxing the restriction to one-to-one matching: we as-
sume that, with positive probability, there is more than one trader on one side
of each local market. This captures two important stylized facts. First, the
seller, of, say, a house, may well be in the position to negotiate with several
potential buyers at the same time. Second, conditions usually vary across
local markets: in a certain region there might be no job vacancies, while, at
the same time, in other regions there is unemployment; a geographical area
may experience a housing shortage, another a glut; and so on.
We show that the local market structures are crucial in the determina-
tion of equilibrium prices. When they are “aligned” with the global market
conditions we are able to restore the Walrasian outcome. On the other hand,
we also show that, for the same global conditions, there are matching mech-
anisms which determine local market conditions such that the outcome is
distinctly non-Walrasian. In highlighting theimportance of local market con-
ditions for price determination, our analysis sheds some light on the source of
the non-Walrasian outcome of the Rubinstein-Wolinsky model: in the pres-
ence of decentralized trade, both local and global market conditions matter,
and the equilibrium price resulting in the Rubinstein-Wolinsky model is af-
fected by the bilateral monopoly nature of the local market they hypothesize.
Our analysis also puts the Gale critique of the non-Walrasian interpre-
tation of Rubinstein and Wolinksy’s result into perspective. In our model,
entry is endogenous, as the incoming ‡ow of new traders is a function of the
market price which, in turn, depends on the local conditions determined by
the matching mechanism. It follows that the Walrasian ‡ow price cannot be
de…ned in terms of the global market parameters alone. If, on the other hand,
we de…ne the Walrasian ‡ow outcome in terms of the equilibrium ‡ow of en-
try, the claim that as frictions disappear the market equilibrium converges
to the Walrasian ‡ow outcome reduces to a tautology.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the model is presented in
Section 2. In Section 3, we obtain the market equilibrium. In Section 4 we
provide comparative statics for the case when the valuations are uniformly
distributed, while in Section 5 we analyze the relationship between the local
market conditions andthe Walrasian price. Finally, Section 6 contains abrief
conclusion and relates our analysis to the existing literature.
22 The model
We followclosely the standardmodel of decentralizedstrategic trade (Rubin-
stein and Wolinsky, 1985). There are large numbers of two types of traders:
the sellers, who own one indivisible unit of a homogeneous good each, and
the buyers, each of whom wishes to consume one unit of the good. For ex-
positional clarity, sellers are female, buyers male. All sellers have the same
valuation for the good, normalized to 0. The buyers’ valuations, v 2 [0;1],
are independent, random draws3 from a known atomless distribution, G(v),
with positive density, g (v). The time horizon is in…nite and divided in peri-
ods, indexed by t, t = 1;2;:::. Traders are risk neutral and discount future
payo¤s by a common factor of ± 2 (0;1) per period. In time period 1, B po-
tential buyers and S potential sellersare present in themarket. The potential
traders who are in the market in the beginning of a period decide whether to
enter the trading stage. We assume that they enter if and only if they expect
a strictly positive payo¤ from trade.4 In each period, the traders who have
entered are matched according to a random matching process, which we dis-
cuss below. Matching is followed by a negotiation phase, where the matched
agents negotiate the terms of trade; if two agents reach an agreement, they
trade, leave the market and are replaced by identical5 agents in the next
period. Consequently, the number of traders on each side of the market, as
well as the distribution of their valuations, are constant over time, and the
market is in steady state. Finally, the traders who do not trade can re-enter
the market in the next period.
Figure 1 sketches the sequence of events within each time period. The
following subsections specify it in detail.
Insert Figure 1 about here
3This is a generalization of the Rubinstein-Wolinsky model, who have homogeneous
valuations on both sides of the market.
4Notice that we cannot have an explicit entry cost. As Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p.
414) point out, even with an in…nitesimal entry cost, the market would not exist. Gale
(1987) avoids this problem by assuming that there are only a …nite number of possible
valuations, and therefore the lowest type makes, generically, positive pro…ts in equilibrium.
5This assumption is realistic if the buyers have actually multi-unit demand, but either
only require at most one unit per period or they are constrained to purchase sequentially
(newspapers, bread, holidays, and post-docs are examples). In these cases, the leaving
and the entering agent is actually the same. Admittedly, however, our main motivation
for this assumption is that only in a stationary environment can we derive the explicit
solution of our model.
32.1 The matching process
The interaction between buyers and sellers isgovernedby astationary match-
ing process. This is a probability distribution over the possible assignments
of buyers to sellers. The novelty of our approach is that we introduce the
possibility of one-to-many matching: a seller can be matched simultaneously
with more than one buyer. However, for simplicity, we do not assume the
converse: each buyer is assigned to at most one seller.
Since the number of possible assignments is very large, in order to retain
tractability, we impose some natural anonymity restrictions. For every k,
…rstly, the probability tobe matchedwith k, buyers is the same for all sellers.
We denote this probability with qk; secondly, the probability that a given
buyer is matched to a seller who is matched with k buyers altogether is
independent of their identities and of the buyer’s valuation; we denote this
probability by pk. The following lemma describes the implications of these
two anonymity restrictions; let B0 be the number of buyers who choose to
enter the matching stage.
Lemma 1 qk =
B0pk
kS for k = 1;:::;B0, and q0 = 1 ¡
PB0







Proof. For any k = 1; :::; B0, there are, on average,
B0pk
k sellers matched with
exactly k buyers, and the anonymity restrictions require that a given seller has
probability 1
S of being one of them.
Therefore, the anonymous decentralized matching mechanism with B0
buyers and S sellers is fully described by B0 parameters, either pk or qk, for
k = 1;:::;B0. Since we would like to control local and global market condi-
tions independently, we want to keep the description of the matching process
exogenous (independent of endogenous entry). To this end, we restrict fur-
ther thematching technology, by rulingout all but one-to-one andtwo-to-one
matches6. In our set-up, restrictingthe degrees offreedomnot only facilitates
6An imaginary chemical example might illustrate the matching technology implied by
our model. The Rubinstein and Wolinsky market can be visualized as a sealed box where
two types of atoms (S and B) are introduced, which can form a molecule by bonding with
each other in a one-to-one bond. The matching phase ends after the box is shaken. The
probability of an atom being matched depends on the ratio between the number of B
atoms and the number of S atoms. In the case considered here, after a one-to-one bond
is formed, creating a (B-S) molecule, a further B atom could attach itself to this (B-S)
molecule to form a (B-B-S) molecule. The hypothesis pk = 0 for k > 2 implies that no
further atoms could bond with a (B-B-S) molecule. The ease with which a B atom bonds
with a loose S atom relative to the ease with which it bonds with a B-S molecule, will
determine the relative frequency of the two types of molecules, B-S and B-B-S, at the end
of the shaking (matching) phase.
4the calculations, but it also strengthens our conclusions, since they would a
fortiori remain true if we considered matching technologies with more pa-
rameters, such as a generic one-to-many or even many-to-many matching.
Assumption 1 There are at most two buyers matched to a seller: pk = qk =
0 for k > 2.
2.2 Negotiations
After the matching process is completed, the matched traders in each lo-
cal market carry out their negotiations. This takes place according to the
standard rules, adapted to the case studied here. The buyers are selected to
make an o¤er with probability ¯ 2 (0;1), the seller with probability 1 ¡ ¯.
For the sake of de…niteness, in any given match, the buyers do not observe
the number of their local competitors: as it will become clear in the proof
of Proposition 1, the converse hypothesis would not alter the qualitative
features of our results.
If the buyers are selected to make the o¤ers, negotiations take place ac-
cording to a sealed-bid, …rst-price auction: each buyer simultaneously makes
the seller an o¤er, among which the seller can either choose the highest (in
which case she and the selected buyer trade at the o¤ered price and leave
the market), or reject them all. If the seller is chosen to make an o¤er, we
follow the existing literature (for example, Gale 1987) in assuming that she
observes the valuations of all the buyers she is matched with, and that she
then makes a price o¤er to one of the buyers, which he can accept or reject.
This mechanism de…nes a local market and aglobal market. Local market
conditions are determined by the actual number of buyers matched with a
given seller (governed by the qk), and can clearly di¤er among local markets.
Global market conditions are the same for all markets, and are characterized
by three parameters: impatience, ±, bargaining power, ¯, and the aggregate
ratio of buyers to sellers, ¸ = B
S.
2.3 An Example
The familiar example of the academic job market may ‡esh out the situa-
tion we have in mind: the good in question is academic labor; there are B
university departments (buyers) and S, ex ante identical, fresh PhD’s, each
looking for an academic appointment (sellers). Each department has a va-
cancy with some exogenous probability (determined, say, by the allocation
of new academic posts across departments in each university). If a depart-
ment has a vacancy, then it selects one candidate, and, on the day after the
5AEA conference, posts a letter with a job o¤er. A department clearly cannot
make more than one o¤er, because it is legally bound to appoint all those
who accept. A few days later, all candidates receive their o¤ers, if any. In
practice, as captured by our model, there is nothing to prevent a candidate
from receiving more than one o¤er, though this possibility is ruled out in the
standard one-to-one matching model. If departments chose randomly among
candidates, then the probability distribution would be binomial. However,
there are other strategies available to departments: for example, suppose a
proportion of departments are “ poachers ”. They make an o¤er to a candi-
date only if that candidate has already received an o¤er. The probability of
a seller to receive more than one o¤er depends on the proportion of buyers
who imitate, andon the ease with which information about o¤ers is divulged.
3 The market equilibrium
Inthis sectionwecharacterize theexpectedequilibriumpayo¤s ofeachtrader;
from these, it is immediate to derive the traders’ equilibrium strategies. The
solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: each trader behaves op-
timally given the equilibrium strategies of the rest of the traders and given
his/her information.
We begin by noting that, given the equilibrium strategies of the active
traders, there exists a buyer valuation, v0, which is the highest valuation
such that a buyer would decide not to enter the matching stage: a buyer
with valuation v0 would expect zero pro…ts in the market. Consequently, in
each period, the number of buyers who enter the matching stage (the buyers




g (v)dv = [1 ¡ G(v0)]B: (1)
This is, of course, a function of the equilibrium payo¤s, which we calculate
next. Propositions 1 and 2 characterize the expected equilibrium payo¤ of
buyers and sellers, respectively.
Proposition 1 The expected equilibrium payo¤ of a buyer with valuation





1¡ ±(1¡ ¯ (p1+ p2G0(x)))
dx; (2)
where G0(x) is the probability distribution induced by the truncation of the
original distribution at v0: G0(x) ´
G(x)¡G(v0)
1¡G(v0) for x 2 [v0;1].
6Proof. When the seller is selected to o¤er, she will make an o¤er which makes a
buyer indi¤erent between acceptanceand rejection. Consequently, all the matched
buyers, whetherchosen by theselleror not, will earn±VB(v). When it isthebuyers
who can submit bids, wecan usetherevenueequivalencetheorem for auctionswith
a stochastic number of bidders and independent private valuations (see McAfee
and McMillan, 1987, and Harstad, Kagel and Levin, 1990). In equilibrium a
(risk neutral) buyer’s expected payo¤ is given by what this buyer would expect
to receive if he bid optimally knowing the number of bidders.7 Consequently, the
buyers’ value function, VB (v), satis…es:
VB (v) = ¯p1(v ¡b1(v)) (3)
+¯p2 [G0 (v)(v ¡b2(v)) +(1 ¡G0(v))±VB(v)]
+(1¡¯(1¡p0))±VB(v);
where bi(v) is the optimal bid for a buyer who has valuation v, when there are
altogether i bidders, i =1;2. The bidding functions, b1(:) and b2(:), are standard,
and can be determined as follows. When there is only one buyer, the bid is given
by the reservation value of the seller: b1(v) = ±VS. If there are two bidders, the
equilibrium bid b2 (v) must be incentive compatible for a buyer of valuation v, in
the sense that he should prefer to bid b2 (v) in preference to bidding any other bid




(v ¡b2(x))G0(x) +±VB(v)(1 ¡G0 (x)): (4)
The …rst order condition for (4) yields a di¤erential equation in b2 (v):
(v ¡b2 (v))g0 (v) ¡b0
2 (v)G0 (v) ¡±VB(v)g0 (v) =0:






(v ¡b2 (v) ¡±VB(v)) s.t.: b2 (v0) =v0:
Its solution is:


















G0 (x) dx´ VB(v)(1 ¡±(1¡¯p1)) ¡¯p1(v ¡±VS):
7For this equilibrium to be implementable by a …rst-price auction it is necessary that
the uncertainty about the number of bidders be symmetric across bidders. This is natural
given our anonymity assumptions on the matching process.




¯ (p1 +p2G0 (v))
1¡±(1¡¯(p1 +p2G0(v)))
:
Integrate and use the initial condition, which implies VB(v0) = 0, to obtain the
Proposition.









VS = ±VS(q0 +¯q1) +¯q2
Z 1
v0









This is because, with probability q0 the seller is unmatched, so she goes to the
next period; this gives her a payo¤±VS. With probability ¯q1, she is matched to a
single buyer, but the buyer’s side is selected to make an o¤er, so she receives only
her continuation payo¤ ±VS. With probability ¯q2, the seller has two buyers and
they make theo¤ers. In this case, by the revenue equivalence theorem, the seller’s
expected revenue is the expected willingness to pay of the lower valuation buyer.
The willingness to pay of the buyer with valuation v is (v ¡±VB(v)), and we take
the expected value of the second order statistic of the willingness to pay: this is
the …rst integral in (6). With probability (1 ¡¯) q2, the seller has two buyers and
she gets to make the o¤er: in this case, she chooses the higher valuation buyer,
and her payo¤ is theexpected valueofthe …rst order statisticofthe willingness to
pay, namely thesecond integral. Finally, with probability (1¡¯)q1, theseller has
one buyer and she makes the o¤er, leaving the buyer at his continuation payo¤.
Rearranging (6), (5) is obtained.
Propositions 1 and 2 determine the traders’ payo¤s as a function of the
valuation of the marginal buyer not entering the market. The additional
equation we need for a full characterization of the equilibrium payo¤s relates
this valuation to the seller’s payo¤.
8Proposition 3 The market equilibrium is characterized by, (1), (2), (5),
and
v0 = ±VS: (7)











Proof. Ignore (8) for the time being. Recall that v0 is the marginal buyer and,
consequently, all buyers with valuation strictly above v0 must expect a strictly
positive payo¤. Therefore, it must be the case that with strictly positive proba-
bility they buy the good at a price strictly below their valuation. However, the
minimum price that the seller is willing to accept is ±VS; and (7) follows.















The …rst term on the RHS is obtained substituting (2) into (5). Clearly, (7) is
equivalent to Á(v0) = 0. We need to check that there is an admissible solution
to this equation. To compact the notation, let a(y) = 1 ¡±(q0 (y) +¯q1 (y)),
» (x;y) = ±¯(p1 +p2G0 (x)), ¾(x;y) =
»(x;y)
1¡±+»(x;y), h(v; y) =
R v
y ¾(x; y)dx and
Q(v; y) =
h

















We need to show that there exists y 2 [0; 1]; such that Á(y) =0. From Lemma 1,
limy¡!1qk (y) = 0; k = 1;2, and therefore limy¡ !1a(y) = 1 ¡±. It follows that,
for ± < 1, 1
a(y) is …nite, and therefore, limy¡!1Á(y) = ¡1
± < 0. Next consider
Á(0). Use v =
R v
0 dx to write the term (v ¡h(v;0)) as
Rv
0 (1¡¾(x; y))dx. Now
note that












(1 ¡¾(x;0))dxQ(v; 0)g0 (v)dv
¾
>0: (10)
Since Á is continuous, it is 0 for some y. Therefore, the existence of a market
equilibrium is guaranteed.
9Now consider (8). A requirement of perfect bayesian equilibrium is that the
post entry matching probabilities be consistent with the beliefs held by the buyers
when they take their entry decision. For this to be the case, theremust be enough
sellers around. At the end of the matching stage B0p1 buyers are alone, B0p2 are
in a couple. Consequently, there must be at least B0p1+
B0p2
2 sellers. This implies
B0
S ￿ 2
2p1+p2, which, using (1) gives (8).
Note that the market equilibrium is not necessarily unique. As in other
models with traders of heterogeneous valuations and with endogenous entry
(see, for example, Bester, 1988), it is possible to …nd a distribution of the
valuations and parameter con…gurations which lead to multiple equilibria.
However, conditional on entry (in our case, v0) the equilibrium is always
unique.
By Proposition 3, v0 is the seller’s reservation price: under no circum-
stances will the seller sell for less than v0; knowing this, no buyer with val-
uation v0 or below will bother to enter the market. Note that the necessary
condition for existence (8) has a natural economic interpretation: it indicates
the extent to which the local and global market conditions can be indepen-
dent. While (8) holds, any change in the global market conditions, ¸, can be
accommodated by changing the sellers’ matching probability, 1¡ q0, leaving
the pk unchanged. Conversely, we can vary this relative probability keeping
the global market conditions constant, if and only if (8) is satis…ed.
Given the sellers’ expected payo¤, we can derive the average price in the
market.












Proof. In equilibrium all matched sellers trade; therefore, the seller’s expected
payo¤, which is v0
± ; must begiven by theaverageprice, weighted by the probability
of trade, (1¡q0), and v0, the payo¤ for going to the next period, weighted by its
probability, q0. The second equality follows from Lemma 1.
Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 give a general characterization: to obtain
an explicit analytical description of the equilibrium, we consider the special
case of a uniform distribution of the buyers’ valuations: G(v) ´ v.
Proposition 4 Let the buyer valuations be uniformly distributed. Then the




















Proof. In the Mathematical Appendix, available on request from the authors, or
at http://www-users.york.ac.uk/~gd4/WalrasAppendix.tex.
4 Comparative statics
Inthis section, westudy howtheequilibriumderivedinProposition4 changes
as the parameters vary. We begin with an increase in local competition. To
distinguish more intense competition from increased search intensity, we de-
…ne a local increase in competition as an increase in p2; keeping p0 constant:8
the same number of matched buyers are distributed less evenly and, there-
fore, the sellers’ side su¤ers a decrease in the probability of being matched
(1 ¡ q0).
Corollary 2 For any given p0, v0 is increasing in p2 if ¯ ¸ 1
2; if ¯ < 1
2;
v0 is increasing (respectively constant, respectively decreasing) in p2 for ± >
1¡2¯
1¡¯(1+p0) (respectively ± =
1¡2¯
1¡¯(1+p0), respectively ± <
1¡2¯
1¡¯(1+p0)).
Proof. In the Mathematical Appendix.
Thus, for some parameter combinations (low values of ¯ and ±), an in-
crease in competition on the buyer’s side may reduce the seller’s payo¤. To
understand this counter-intuitive result, note that an increase in p2 has two
separate e¤ects on the sellers’ payo¤. A direct e¤ect is the increase in the
frequency of two-to-one matches, where the price is higher (in expectation).
The importance of this e¤ect is an increasing function of ¯: the di¤erence
in the seller’s payo¤ between a two-to-one and a one-to-one match is higher
when she has low bargaining power, as her payo¤ in a two-to-one match is
less sensitive to which side of the market is chosen to make the o¤ers. But
there is also an indirect e¤ect, which works in the opposite direction: when
local (buyer) competition is increased, for …xed p0, the probability of a seller
being matched in any given period is reduced. This provokes a delay in the
expected time of trade, and has a negative e¤ect on the seller’s payo¤. This
8In terms of our chemical example, (footnote 6), this entails that for a loose B atom
it becomes easier to bond with a B-S molecule and more di¢cult to bond with a loose
S atom. In terms of our job market example, in Section 2.3, this might happen if more
departments become poachers, or if information about job o¤ers by other departments
becomes more di¤use.
11e¤ect becomes weaker as ¯ increases; to understand why this is the case, con-






dp2: an increase in local buyer competition (an increase in p2,
keeping p0 constant) distributes probability mass from one-to-one matches
towards two-to-one matches and no matches in equal proportion. Now, re-
call that when the buyers make o¤ers in a one-to-one match, the sellers just
earn their continuation value, which is what they would expect to get if they
were unmatched. Consequently, for high ¯ the payo¤ loss due to an increase
in q0 and a corresponding decrease in q1 is small, and it is swamped by
the positive e¤ect of an increase in the probability of bidding competition.
Therefore, when ¯ is su¢ciently high the direct (price) e¤ect dominates the
indirect (matching) e¤ect for any ±: The speci…c critical value, ¯ = 1
2, is due
to the uniform distribution of the buyers’ valuations, and does not generalize.
Since the indirect e¤ect is due to a delay cost, it disappears when the cost of
delay vanishes: in the limit, as ± ! 1, the seller’s payo¤ is always increasing
in p2 for any ¯ > 0.
Next, we consider changes in the global market conditions: they a¤ect
the price in the expected manner.
Corollary 3 v0 is decreasing in ¯, and increasing in ¸ and in ±.
Proof. In the Mathematical Appendix.
In words, given the local market structure, the sellers’ expected payo¤
increases with their bargaining power anddecreases withtheir aggregatepro-
portion in the market. At the same time, as frictions decrease, the minimal
valuation of the buyers who trade increases.
We end this section with the study of the role played by ¯ at the extreme
values of its admissible range.
Corollary 4 lim
¯!0
v0(:) = 1, lim
¯!1
v0(:) > 0.
If all the local bargaining power is with the sellers (¯ ! 0) they get the
whole surplus; however, the converse is not true: the sellers’ payo¤ is strictly
positive as ¯ ! 1. This is because, even if the seller has no local bargaining
power, she can always rely on the bene…cial e¤ect of (bidding) competition
among buyers; unless, of course, p1 also tends to 1 (see below, Proposition
5), in which case local competition becomes negligible, andher payo¤ is zero.
125 Local conditions and the Walrasian out-
come
We can now come to the study of the relationship between local market
structure in decentralized trade mechanisms and the market outcome in the
limit as frictions disappear. Speci…cally, we ask the following question: Are
there matching mechanisms which determine local market conditions such
that the (expected) outcome of decentralized trade, under that mechanism,
is the same as would be obtained in a Walrasian global market, namely the
intersection of the current global demand and supply curves? We are able
to answer this question in the a¢rmative. This is important, in view of the
negative answer that Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) and Wolinsky (1988)
obtain with their local trading mechanisms.
We begin by de…ning the (static) Walrasian outcome. Supply is the
vertical line S. With a uniform distribution of valuations, (inverse) de-











, which is also the sellers’ payo¤. We con-
sider separately the cases of low and high ¸: low ¸ implies that the sellers
are on the long side of the market, that is, global and local conditions are
not aligned. In this case, we obtain a generalization of the Rubinstein and
Wolinsky (1985) result:
Proposition 5 Let the sellers be on the long side ofthe global market (¸ ￿ 1).
The static Walrasian price obtains if and only if the buyers’ probability of
two-to-one matching, p2, tends to 0, and either their bargaining power, ¯, or
the discount rate, ±, tend to 1.
Proof. When ¸ ￿ 1, the Walrasian price is 0. By Corollaries 2 and 3, we know
that v0 is decreasing in ¯ and that for high ¯ it is increasing in p2: Consequently,
it only reaches its minimum when the conditions of the proposition are satis…ed.
Thus, all we need to show is that these conditions are su¢cient to yield the price
of zero. Now, observe that P =
v0(1¡±q0)
±(1¡q0) tends to 0 only when v0 tends to 0; while
v0 tends to 0 only as f ! 0. Using (11), we obtain:
lim
p1!1¡p0





and the result follows.
That is, for the static Walrasian price to obtain, it must be the case that
the sellers have no market power at the local level. In addition, unless agents
13are in…nitely patient, sellers must not have any bargaining power either.9
To interpret this conclusion, note that, when ¸ ￿ 1, the buyers are on the
short side of the global market. However, the matching mechanism that we
have set up is such that the buyers are, by construction, on the (weakly)
long side of the local markets. Proposition 5 can therefore be interpreted as
saying that the static Walrasian outcome cannot obtain if there is a con‡ict
between local and global market conditions, in the sense that the long side
of the global market is the short side of the local markets. Indeed, as the
following Proposition shows, in the extreme case, where the long side of the
global market has the full market power in the local markets, they receive






Proof. Follows immediately from (11).
Note thatthis result holds independently ofboth theglobal market condi-
tions, ¸, and the distribution of bargaining power, ¯. Proposition 6 therefore
shows that the local market structure can be more relevant in determining
the market outcome than either of those indicators. And yet, it has been ne-
glected by the existing literature, which has focused on the role of the global
market conditions and the bargaining power.
We now turn to the case ¸ > 1, which we view as more natural, because,
in this case, the local conditions re‡ect the global market conditions. For
example, if there exists unemployment nationally, viz if there are few buyers,
then, in any given locality, excess supply of labor seems more likely than
excess demand.10
The next result shows that the equilibrium price determined by the de-
centralized trading mechanism studied in this paper can equal the static
Walrasian price, provided the globally long side of the market has su¢cient
bargaining power.






, there exists p1 2 (0;1) such that the expected average
market price coincides with the static Walrasian price.
9Recall that Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) is a special case: they assumed that the
market power is evenly distributed (one-to-one matches), and showed that the globally
long side can have no bargaining power to obtain the Walrasian outcome.
10Note also that, given our assumptions on the distribution of the traders’ valuations,
only when ¸ > 1 the static Walrasian price is strictly between the sellers’ valuation and
the highest possible buyer valuation, implying that traders on both sides of the market
receive a strictly positive payo¤.
14Proof. The proof requires that there exists a value of p1, say p¤, such that
v0 = ¸¡1
¸ , and that this p¤ is feasible, in the sense that it satis…es (8). Given










f (±;¯; p1;0) (we set p0 =0, as this is the most stringent case, since the locus (8)
is increasing in p0), weobtain that p¤ must satisfy: f (±;¯; p¤;0) =1¡¸. Ifsuch p¤
does exists, then it alwayssatis…es (8). Thisis because, using f (±;¯; p1; 0) =1¡¸,
(8) can be written as ¸¡
2(1+p1)¡4(1¡¸)
(1+p1)
2 < 0, or ¸> 2
p1+3, which is always satis…ed
as ¸ >1.
Because f is a continuous and, for ± ! 1, monotonically increasing func-
tion of p1, and because lim±!1 (limp1!0 f (±;¯; p1; p0)) = ¡1, the proposition
obtains if lim±!1 (limp1!1 f (±;¯; p1; p0)) >1¡¸. Evaluating the limit, the above
becomes (again considering the most stringent case, p0 = 0): ¡1¡¯
2¯ > 1 ¡ ¸.
Whenever this holds, then, by the Weierstrass theorem, there exists p¤ such that
lim±!1 f (±;¯; p¤; p0) =1 ¡¸. This establishes the result.
Note that, as ¸ increases, the range of values of ¯ such that the static
Walrasian outcome is feasible also increases. Loosely speaking, this suggests
that there is a trade-o¤ between local and global market conditions. A high
value of ¸ indicates poor global market conditions, whereas a high value of
¯ indicates good local conditions, from the buyer’s point of view.
Both in Wolinsky’s (1988) analysis and in Proposition 7 the local market
conditions re‡ect the global market conditions. However, in contrast to our
conclusion, Wolinsky (1988) obtains a strongly non-Walrasian outcome. In
his main result (Proposition 2), he shows that converting aggregate excess
supply into local competition cannot restore the Walrasianoutcome, and can
in fact result in a price which is even farther from the Walrasian price than
that obtained in Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985); in particular, as frictions
disappear, the long side (both locally and globally) of the market receives all
the surplus from trade. The reason for this counterintuitive conclusion rests
inthe way inwhichWolinsky modelsthe traders’ valuations. Heassumes that
traders draw a new valuation in each period. This creates a direct bene…cial
e¤ect of waiting: as frictions disappear, it becomes worthwhile for a buyer to
wait until he draws a high valuation and, consequently, his incentive to bid
seriously is weakened: in the limit this destroys instantaneous competition.
In our set-up, delaying trade is justi…ed only as a way to obtain better terms
in the future, which is consistent with the rest of the literature on strategic
bargaining, as well as with economic intuition.
156 Concluding remarks
A fundamental component of the non-cooperative game theory program is
the description of extensive form games –that is the formal sequences of
moves and countermoves by the agents– which can be applied to economic
situations. The next step consists in verifying that the appropriate equilib-
rium of the proposed game corresponds towhat economists have believed the
equilibrium to be in the economic situation considered. The contribution of
our paper can also be interpreted in this vein: the most classical economic
problem, the determination of the equilibrium price in the market for a ho-
mogeneous good, is clearly a very natural candidate for the application of
this game-theoretic program. Since Marshall (1890, p. 333), we all teach our
students thatthe equilibriumprice is given by the intersectionof demandand
supply; but we would be unable to give a satisfactory answer to an innocent
audience question as to why this should be the case. Indeed, the literature
starting with Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) appeared to have dealt a fatal
blow to the possibility of …nding an extensive form game whose equilibrium
corresponds to the accepted notion of equilibrium. They propose a very nat-
ural decentralized trade mechanism which does not lead to the Walrasian
outcome. However, we generalize the Rubinstein-Wolinsky mechanism and
we both obtain a more natural mechanism –allowing as it does conditions to
vary across local markets–, and show that decentralized trade may lead to
the Walrasian outcome.
As far as we are aware, the matching mechanism introduced by Wolinsky
(1988) –also used in a di¤erent context by Coles and Muthoo (1998)– is the
only one not restricting matching to be one-to-one. However, apart from his
counterintuitive result discussed above, his model is not well suited to the
study of the interplay between local and global market conditions, because,
by virtue of his assumption that the matching process is governed by the
binomial distribution, the global conditions (the ratio of buyers to sellers)
uniquely determine the local conditions (the probability of one-to-j matching,
for the various admissible values of j).
Gale(1988)presents amodel withonebuyer andtwosellers, where ineach
period it is random whether the sellers bid competitively (ex ante pricing)
or one of them is selected to make an o¤er (ex post pricing). This set-up
might be seen as a parsimonious version of our market game with many-to-
one matching; however, the loss of generality is signi…cant. His main result is
that independently of how small the probability of competition is, as frictions
disappear, the outcome becomes fully competitive (price equals the sellers’
valuation). But, this result hinges on the assumption that there is a single
buyer and therefore the sellers cannot freely decide to delay trade, while the
16buyer can. As we show here, in a market context, the fully competitive result
only obtains if instantaneous competition is guaranteed.
Another related paper suggests a di¤erent interpretation of our results:
Taylor (1995) assumes that the aggregate market conditions are governed by
anexogenous randomvariable. He observes that the current global conditions
are not su¢cient to determine the market price. This is because traders
expect the global short and long sides to switch around, and this allows the
forward looking equilibria to be markedly di¤erent in each period from the
static Walrasian price. In our paper, it is also the case that knowledge of the
aggregate demand and supply in a large decentralized market is not su¢cient
to generate predictions about themarket equilibrium, not even about the ‡ow
of agents in and out of the market. Consequently, –paralleling Gale’s critique
of the static concept of Walrasian equilibrium– we are led to the conclusion
that, in a decentralized market, the description of the global conditions is
not su¢cient for an unambiguous de…nition of the Walrasian equilibrium: it
is necessary to include the description the micro-structure, that is of the local
market conditions.
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